

## EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

## Routing Slip

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3	EXDIR				
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SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks:

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8/ Executive Secretary  
 2/3/83  
 Date

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**United States  
Information  
Agency**

Director

**USIA**

Washington, D.C. 20547

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Executive Registry

83-0533/1

February 2, 1983

Dear Bill:

In my letter to you of January 21, I outlined a suggestion as to how the Administration might be able to deal with the issue of strict reciprocity in exchanges with the Soviet Union. The subject of strict reciprocity is addressed in the final version of NSDD 75, "U.S. Relations with the USSR."

As I mentioned in my earlier letter, we had intended to ask the FBI to comment on security problems created by Soviet cultural and exchange groups when they come to the U.S. We planned to include information provided by the FBI in a memo to Bill Clark.

Last week, several members of my staff met with a senior representative of the FBI to discuss these problems. I thought you might be interested in the following points made by the FBI in that meeting:

- The number of Soviet intelligence affiliated individuals travelling to the U.S. with exchange groups increased by 57% in FY '82, compared to the previous year.
- Even though the number of Soviet exchange groups visiting the U.S. in FY '82 decreased by 14% over the previous year, the number of people within these groups increased by 28%.
- Within specialized academic groups visiting the U.S. to attend seminars, particularly on peace and disarmament issues, the number of KGB operatives has risen by 50%.

The Honorable  
William J. Casey  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

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Classified by: Charles Z. Wick  
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NSDD 75

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
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The FBI considers the trends cited above "alarming." It takes 90 FBI employees to monitor ten Soviets on a full-time basis. The FBI reports that it does not have the resources for this kind of thorough coverage.

I would appreciate your having someone on your staff provide any comments the CIA might have on this issue, as requested in my letter of January 21. I would like to move quickly in passing this material on to Bill Clark.

Again, many thanks for your assistance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Charlie", written over a horizontal line.

Charles Z. Wick

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
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I would also be very interested in any comments you, as Director of Central Intelligence, might offer on the negative aspects of large numbers of Soviets entering the U.S. on cultural or exchange visits.

My objective is to provide persuasive evidence as to why it would be in the national interest to selectively withhold visas to frustrate these Soviet unreciprocated opportunities.

I look forward to hearing from you and with thanks in advance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Charles Z. Wick', with a large, stylized loop at the end of the signature.

Charles Z. Wick

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**United States  
Information  
Agency**

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Director



**USIA**

Washington, D.C. 20547

January 21, 1983

Executive Registry

83-0533

Dear Bill:

On December 22, I sent Bill Clark a memo on the proposed NSDD on U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union (attachment A). In my memo, I discussed the need for strict reciprocity in exchanges with the Soviet Union.

I have received the final version of NSDD 75, entitled "U.S. Relations with the USSR", and am pleased to note that the language I suggested on reciprocity has been included on page 6, paragraph 3 (see attachment B).

In a memo I am preparing to send to Bill Clark (attachment C), I state that "...the Soviets should not be allowed to exploit our pluralistic system and private sector mechanisms" in pursuing cultural exchanges with the U.S.

Since now is not the time for a cultural agreement with the Soviets, it seems to me that the best way to deal with the situation is found in 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (d) (supp. V 1976):

"The Secretary of State may refuse to recommend a waiver for aliens from signatory countries which are not in substantial compliance with the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, particularly the human rights and humanitarian affairs provisions."

Thus, the State Department can withhold visas from Soviet cultural and exchange groups. In this way, the strict reciprocity called for in NSDD 75 can be maintained.

The FBI has agreed to comment on opportunities inimical to the U.S. Government created by these Soviet cultural groups when they come to the U.S. I plan to include any information they may wish to provide in my memo to Bill Clark.

The Honorable  
William J. Casey  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

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
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Washington, D.C. 20547

USIA

DEC 22 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable  
Judge William P. Clark, Jr.  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House

FROM : Charles Z. Wick   
Director

SUBJECT : The NSC Meeting on the Proposed NSDD on  
U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union,  
December 16, 1982.

SUMMARY

Our session with the President and the other distinguished minds was thought-provoking. You suggested further study of the issue I brought up concerning "strict reciprocity" of exchanges.

The proposed NSDD speaks of the principle of "strict reciprocity" and of "full reciprocity" in negotiations with the Soviet Union. This principle should apply to exchanges as well as other elements.

"Strict reciprocity" and "full reciprocity" should deny the Soviets their current ability to go outside official "reciprocity" by dealing directly with our private sector. The proposed NSDD also reads "...controls over transfers of military related/dual-use technology, products, and services must be tightened." We need to say similarly that "controls over transfer of IDEOLOGICAL ...products and services must be tightened."

To achieve this strict ideological "reciprocity" there might be a need to prepare the way either for executive action, such as the withholding of visas, or legislation. A sustained public affairs effort undoubtedly would be needed to persuade the American public, particularly the media, that the Soviets should not be allowed to exploit our pluralistic system and private sector mechanisms. The question is: Should we do anything about this? If so, WHAT ARE WE GOING TO DO?

I propose an addition to the text on "U.S.-Soviet Cooperative Exchanges" in the proposed NSDD at Page 6. The underlined words

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in the following quotation from Page 40 in the IG Study were deleted from the proposed NSDD (Page 6, #3). I recommend that the underlined sentences be included also in the proposed NSDD as follows.

"U.S.-Soviet Cooperative Exchanges: The role of U.S.-Soviet cultural, educational, scientific and other cooperative exchanges should be seen in light of the U.S. intention to maintain a strong ideological component in relations with Moscow. The U.S. should not further dismantle the framework of exchanges; indeed those exchanges which have the potential for advancing the objective of promoting evolutionary change within the Soviet system should be expanded. At the same time, a greater effort is needed to secure full reciprocity [emphasis added] (and to encourage the Allies to do so as well). This recognizes that unless the U.S. has an effective official framework for handling exchanges, the Soviets will make separate arrangements with private U.S. sponsors, while denying reciprocal access to the Soviet Union. As exchanges develop, U.S. policy must also take into account the necessity to restrict transfers of sensitive U.S. technology to the Soviet Union."

The quoted foregoing first of the underlined sentences clearly recognizes the inevitable ideological nature of exchanges between the U.S. and the USSR. The second quoted underlined sentence recognizes that unless we establish "an effective official framework for handling exchanges" we have no hope of forcing the Soviets to back off from their deliberate denial of reciprocal access for us into the Soviet Union.

The Soviets visiting the U.S. on non-official exchanges type activities -- athletes and other performers, university scholars and others -- are inherently nice enough people. But, Americans can be misled by the many "nice" Soviets circulating in the United States. It is all too easy for many Americans to forget that it is not the nice Soviet people who run the Soviet Union, but rather the sinister elites -- the same ones who ordered the invasion of Afghanistan and are behind the repression of the Polish people and the abolition of Solidarity.

END OF SUMMARY

An Issues and Background section follows.

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ISSUES AND BACKGROUNDPrinciple of Strict and Full Reciprocity

The Soviets presently can exploit our pluralistic system and private sector mechanisms to flood the United States with their informational efforts, sports events and other cultural presentations, while practically cutting us out of any counter informational efforts within their own country. On any given day the Arbatovs of the Soviet Union have access to our major networks, cable talk shows and newspapers, whereas very few, if any, Americans appear on Soviet TV. Even distribution of our America Illustrated magazine is severely limited by the Soviets. They control sales of the paltry 60,000 copies per issue accepted for distribution by the Soviet news agency to such an extent that they regularly return 7,000 to 10,000 copies of each issue, claiming that they were "Unsold." And as for our use of the airwaves, the Soviets are heavily jamming USIA's VOA broadcasts in the vernacular languages to prevent us from reaching the Soviet people.

The problem is far more serious than many Americans realize. We have computerized our data on non-official exchanges-type activities the Soviets recently have been able to undertake in the United States. While it is difficult to track all that the Soviets are doing in the U.S., the attached partial listing of such activities just since the beginning of this year is indeed impressive evidence of what the Soviets are sending here to American audiences in the absence of controls that would give us "strict" and "full" reciprocity (See Tab A).

The counterflow of U.S. non-official exchanges-type activities in the Soviet Union during 1982 to date is fairly reflected, to the best of our knowledge, in the partial listing attached at Tab B. Travel to the USSR by private American citizens consists mainly of tourist travel. In most cases, the Americans involved approach the Soviets directly, or work through a U.S. travel agent, who must, in turn, work through the Soviet travel agency "Intourist".

The Soviet authorities actually permit virtually no genuine tourist traffic as such from the USSR to the United States. From that perspective, the number of Soviet tourists coming to the U.S. is infinitesimal. The Soviets visiting the U.S. on non-official exchanges type activities -- athletes and other performers, university scholars and others -- are inherently nice enough people. However, they are not generally among the nomenklatura, that is, the controlling elite of the Soviet system, so their positive impressions of the United States

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have little impact on the ruling elite in the Soviet Union. At the same time many Americans can be misled by the many "nice" Soviets circulating in the United States. It is all too easy for Americans to forget that it is not the nice Soviet people who run the Soviet Union, but rather the sinister elites -- the same ones who ordered the invasion of Afghanistan and are behind the repression of the Polish people and the abolition of Solidarity.

**U.S.-USSR Exchanges Agreements -- Before Afghanistan**

Before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, official Soviet American exchanges were carried out under the auspices of bilateral official exchanges agreements covering contacts and exchanges in cultural, educational, scientific, technical and other fields. Although such previous bilateral official exchanges agreements certainly could not give us strict and full reciprocity, they did at least permit us to exert some considerable control over the type of major informational and cultural attractions the Soviets were able to bring to the United States.

Even more important, we were able to get into the Soviet Union with one of our very most effective ideological weapons -- USIA thematic exhibits -- and in numerous instances we were able to negotiate with the Soviets to get them to accept higher quality and more representative performing arts groups from the United States than they otherwise would have sought to arrange for.

Re-negotiation of the U.S.-USSR cultural exchanges agreement, which expired at the end of December, 1979, was suspended by the USG after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It has been U.S. policy since then not to send any official "high-visibility" informational or cultural events to the Soviet Union, such as USIA thematic exhibits and officially-sponsored U.S. performing arts groups. However, the Soviets are able to deal directly with the U.S. private sector with no constraints by the USG.

**USIA Thematic Exhibits in the USSR**

I wish to make special note of the fact that USIA's thematic exhibits have always had tremendous impact in the Soviet Union. Among the USIA exhibits we have shown in numerous cities throughout the Soviet Union in recent years (before Afghanistan) were "Agriculture-USA", "Photography-USA", "Technology of the American Home", "Outdoor Recreation-USA", "Education-USA", and "Graphics-USA". Reciprocally, in the USA the Soviets have shown such exhibits as Soviet Women, Soviet Sport, Soviet Youth, and Soviet Folk Art.

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USIA's thematic exhibits in the Soviet Union have always been anathema to the Soviet authorities because they are so ideologically effective in every way. The Russian-speaking American guides that work with the exhibits have always had enormous ideological impact on Soviet visitors to our exhibits. USIA officers and Department of State officers personally acquainted with the operation of USIA's thematic exhibits in the Soviet Union uniformly have praised the positive impact and influence of our Russian-speaking American guide corps. The guides spend long hours on the floor of the exhibit answering all kinds of questions about the United States and its policies, with many of the questions posed by hostile interlocutors. USIA has no other mass medium which affords us such innumerable face-to-face dialogues with our target audiences in the Soviet Union. The after hours social and private contacts of the guides also have received enthusiastic affirmations from USIA and State officers. In his incomparable style, William F. Buckley, Jr. provided numerous insights into the effectiveness of USIA thematic exhibits during his first hand assessment of the "Research and Development-USA" exhibit in the Soviet Union in 1972. (See Tab C).

Given the ineffectiveness of prior Soviet exhibits in the United States, the Soviet authorities were forced to accept our exhibits in the past only because of the USG position -- no USIA exhibits, no exchanges agreements. Therefore, when the time is appropriate, considering the interests of the U.S. Government, we will be able to get USIA thematic exhibits back into the Soviet Union only by once again adopting the same negotiating position -- no USIA exhibits, no exchanges agreements.

### Major Performing Arts Groups

In the matter of major performing arts groups exchanged under the framework of the previous bilateral official exchanges agreements, we were able to get into the Soviet Union (from 1970 to 1979, for example) such prestigious presentations as: "The Gin Game" (Broadway Production), Paul Taylor Dance Company, New York Philharmonic, Arena Stage, American Conservatory Theater, Duke Ellington Orchestra, New York City Ballet and the Alvin Ailey Dancers. Soviet groups appearing in the U.S. included the Bolshoi Opera, Georgian Dancers, Kirov Ballet. In addition the Bolshoi Ballet, Moiseyev Dancers and the Moscow Circus appeared more than once.

In the period since the invasion of Afghanistan the USG has not sent any major performing arts groups to the Soviet Union, and the Soviets have not sent any to the United States to date. However, the USSR is now seriously engaged in arranging end

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runs. In recent negotiations the Soviets have made concrete offers to Jerry Weintraub-Armand Hammer Productions that include the Moiseyev Dancers (fall of 1983), the Bolshoi Theater (end of 1984) and the Moscow Circus (anytime). They have also offered Weintraub-Hammer packaging and TV rights for Soviet sports groups in the U.S. Soviet films and a Week of Soviet Music in New York (to include prominent Soviet musicians and composers) have also been offered. (See the attached cable from Moscow, Tab D, and an earlier story from The Washington Times, October 7, 1982, Tab E.)

The combination of Soviet officials negotiating with private U.S. individuals and organizations is not likely to result in the best in American culture being represented in the Soviet Union.

Moreover, in their most recent maneuvers regarding their negotiations on major Soviet performing arts groups with Weintraub-Hammer Productions, the Soviet cultural authorities are clearly following their usual modus operandi of wanting to have their cake and eat it too. Their latest gambit is to sound out our Embassy in Moscow as to the possibility of getting written USG "approval" (in the form of an exchange of notes) regarding specific performing groups that they want to send to the U.S. under the private auspices of Weintraub-Hammer Productions.

This is because Soviet cultural authorities want to have the USG assume official responsibility for the physical safety of Soviet performing artists while in the U.S., notwithstanding the fact that the Soviets are making their arrangements through private organizations. At the same time there is no mention on their part of extending the U.S. Government any choices or decisions regarding which U.S. performing arts groups might be asked to perform before the Soviet public in the USSR. (See Tab F.)

Conclusion

In sum, I believe it is important for the NSDD to recognize that, in the language used in the IG Study, "unless the U.S. has an effective official framework for handling exchanges" the Soviets can continue to engage in many cultural and other exchanges-type activities important to them, ideologically and otherwise, while they can at the same time lock the U.S. out of reciprocity regarding major ideological/political exchange programs of importance to the United States in the "war of ideas."

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PARTIAL LISTING OF SOVIET NON-OFFICIAL EXCHANGES ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. IN 1982

No. of persons	Description	Sponsor	Length of Stay	Date	Places Visited	Remarks
21	Soviet Luge Team	US Luge Ass.	14 Days	1/14/82	Lake Placid, NY	
2	Meeting of Ex. Comm. of Int. Olympic Comm.	US Olympic Organizing Comm		1/29/82	Los Angeles, Cal.	
1	Jr. Congress, Int. Luge Federation	U.S. Luge Ass.	12 Days	1/14/82	Lake Placid, NY	
1	Research Work, Ill. U.	Illinois U.	12 Months	1/19/82	Washington DC Chicago, Urbana	
2	University-University Agreement	Lowell U.	12 Days	1/12/82	Boston, Lowell	
28	Soviet Basketball Team		10 Days	1/82		
1	Annual Agribusiness Exec. Education Program		4 Days	1/82		
2	Invited by Minn. U.	Minnesota U.	15 Days	1/82		Purpose unknown
5	Wrld. Fellowship, Orth. Youth Organizations (SYNDESMOS)		11 Days	1/82		
1	Research Work at Am. Universities	Case Western Reserve U.	21 Days	2/2/82	Washington, DC Cleveland, Detroit, Princeton	
1	Research Work	Wash. U. in Seattle	30 Days	1/26/82	Washington DC Seattle	
65	TOTAL					

1	Research Work	Smith College	3 Months	2/2/82	Washington DC Northampton Boston	
1	Research Work	Ohio U., Akron	3 Months	1/28/82	Washington, Akron	
1	Research Work	Purdue U.	3 Months	1-2/82		
1	Negotiations w/"Citizen Exchange Council"	"Citizen Exch. Council"	14 Days	2/2/82	Washington DC NY, Chicago Philadelphia	Part of Next Group
2	Negotiations w/"Citizen Exchange Council"	"Citizen Exch. Council"	11 Days	1/31/82	Washington DC NY, Chicago Philadelphia	
2	NWCC 3rd Annual Conf.	National Womens Conf. Committee	7 Days	2/4/82	Washington DC Louisville	
3	Meeting, IOC Exec. Comm and Talks, Internat. Sports Federation	IOC, Internat. Sports Fed.	10 Days	1/29/82	Los Angeles	
1	Visit to Seattle for "Tashkent Days"	Mayor, Seattle, Washington	8 Days	1/10/82	Seattle, Wash.	See Rest of Group Below
5	UN Ass. Bilateral Meeting on Problems of Disarmament & Econ.	UN Association	11 Days	1/26/82	NY, Washington DC Hershey, Detroit Ann Arbor	
1	Lecture before Communities of United Method. Church	United Method. Church	15 Days	2/14/82	Florida	
7	Working Group on Science Policy		4 Days	1-2/82		
2	Meeting w/. Exec. Comm. IOC	IOC	6 Days	1/82	Los Angeles	
27	TOTAL					

2	Chess Master Tour	"The Game Room" New York	30 Days	2/20/82	New York	Soviet and Wife (Translator)
2	MTS Conference	MTS	11 Days	2/82	USC, Los Angeles	No Travel to San Francisco or Other Visits Authorized
3	Molecular Genetics on Cholera Toxin	US Academic Institutions	2 Weeks	2/11/82		
14	USSR "Tashkent Days"	U. Seattle, Wash	8 Days	1/10/82	Seattle via At- lanta, Georgia	
1	PALME Commission Meet- ing	PALME Com.	One Month	2/11/82	Boston, New York	
5	World Cup Downhill Skiers	Invited by USA Ski Sport Fed.	8 Days	2/28/82	Aspen Colorado	No Visa Support
1	PALME Commision Meet- ing	Columbia U.	5 Days	2/18/82	NY, Washington Boston, Cambridge Mount Kisco	Authorized Only For PALME Meeting
1	Research Work	U. of Maryland	3 Months	3/1/82	Washington DC	
2	Conference on "Inter- national Assessment of Quantitative History"	U. of Missouri, Columbia	15 Days	3/1/82	Washington, NY Princeton	
1	Research Work	Kennan Inst. for Advanced Russian Studies	30 Days	3/1/82	Washington DC	Trip Postponed "Several Months"
1	Scientific Research Work	Princeton U.	3 Months	3/1/82	Washington DC Princeton	No Visa Support
33	TOTAL					

2	10th National Conference of the Latin American Studies Association	LASA, Pittsburg University	8 Days	3/3/82	Washington DC	
1	Scientific Training	Boston U.	4 Months	2-3/82	Boston	
1	Returning to Place of Work (Dean)	Russian Orthodox Cathedral, in New York	6 Months	5-6/82	New York	
1	XVI & XVII Sessions of Inter-Gov'tal Working Group on Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations		20 Days	2/82		Authorized for 16th Session Only
16	Soviet Gymnastic Team	U.S. Gymnastics Federation	9 Days	3/3/82	NY, Jacksonville	
1	Research Work	American Museum of Natural History	6 Weeks	3/11/82	Washington DC New York	
4	Meeting of Internat. Studies Ass. in Cincinnati	Claremont Grad. School	8 Days	3/22/82	Washington DC Cincinnati	
1	Franklin D. Roosevelt Conference	Hofstra U.	7 Days	3/3/82	Hempstead, NY	Traveling with Below
1	Franklin D. Roosevelt Conference	Hofstra U.	21 Days	3/3/82	Hempstead, NY	No Support for Additional 14 Days
2	Negotiations on Co-operation w/ US Youth and Tourist Organizations	"Friendship Ambassadors" Organization	7 Days	3/29/82	NY, Washington DC Montclair	
30	TOTAL					



1	Invited	Armand Hammer	7 Days	3/82		
2	Meeting of UIT Pistol Committee	National Rifle Association	9 Days	4/5/82	Philadelphia	
35	Soviet Wrestling Team	U.S. Wrestling Federation	15 Days	3/82		No Support for Additional 5 Judges or Doctor
6	Exhibition Tournament of the World's Strongest Weight Lifters	US Weight Lifting Federation	12 Days	4/1/82	NY, Atlantic City	
1	20th Anniversary of "Labor Today"	"Labor Today" Editor	10 Days	4/26/82	New York, Chicago	
2	All Saints Russian Orthodox Church	Parish of Pine Bush	1 Year	4/8/82	New York	
24	Soviet Tourists on Thomas Cook Tour	Thomas Cook Tours	16 Days	4/15/82	Washington DC Boston, Baltimore Philadelphia, NY	
1	Research Work	U. of Connecticut	30 Days	9/9/82	Hartford	
3	To Watch Stanley Cup Finals		15 Days	5/82		
1	Russian Language Teacher	American-Russian Institute	1 Year	8/82	San Francisco	
1	Meeting of World Ass. for Public Opinion Research		8 Days	5/82		
3	Internat. Conference of "Women of the World Working for Peace"	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom	10 Days	5/31/82	New York	
2	Attend Special Session UNGA on Disarmament, WPC Membership	Dept. of Public Information, United Nations	35 Days	6/2/82	New York	

23	Tourists on Thomas Cook Tour	Thomas Cook Tours	20 Days	6/8/82	San Diego, Las Vegas, LA, San Francisco	
3	Congress of the International Ass. of Olympic Medical Officers	I.A.O.M.O.	9 Days	5/27/82	Los Angeles Phoenix, Arizona	
2	5th Annual Meeting of Internat. Soc. of Political Psychology and Visit to Esalen Institute	Human Factors Research Associates	15 Days	6/21/82	Washington DC San Francisco	
1	Mongolian to UN Seminar for Journalists	Public Info., United Nations	10 Days	6/1/82	New York	
1	Member of Internat. Committee for European Security and Cooperation Delegation to UNGA Special Session on Disarmament		12 Days	6/3/82	New York	No Visa Support
1	Member of Organization for Solidarity with Peoples of Asia and Africa Delegation to UNGA Special Session on Disarmament		15 Days	6/2/82	New York	No Visa Support
1	Sports Observer to Cover US-USSR Track and Field Athletics Match	American Broadcasting Company	8 Days	7/1/82	Indianapolis	
19	Soviet Gymnastics Team	US Gymnastics Federation	8 Days	6/14/82	Fort Worth	
10	Soviet Cycling Team	US Cycling Federation	17 Days	6/4/82	Denver, Colorado	
1	Non-Government Organization Member to UNGA Special Session on Disarmament	United Nations	35 Days	6/2/82	New York	
62	TOTAL					

1	Non-Government Organization Member to UNGA Special Session on Disarmament	United Nations	14 Days	6/3/82	New York
1	Negotiations with US Publishers	Nat. Geographic Time - Life	4 Days	5/82	
2	Members of Soviet Gymnastics Team	U.S. Gymnastics Federation	8 Days	6/14/82	Fort Worth
3	Attend Board Meeting of Dance Committee of Internat. Institute of Theater	Invitation of Governor of Mississippi	10 Days	8/20/82	Jackson, Mississippi
2	Meeting of Exec. Group of Commission of Churches on Internat. Affairs (CCIA) of the World Council of Churches	CCIA	7 Days	6/14/82	New York
1	Attend Special Session on Disarmament of UNGA as Member of Internat. Fed. of Resistance Fighters - WPC Membership	Fir Col SSD/- ROEM/2	9 Days	6/21/82	New York
2	Members of Internat. Democratic Women's Fed. to UNGA Special Session on Disarmament - WPC Membership	Sec. Gen. FDIF	10 Days	6/21/82	New York
1	Member of Internat. Ass. of Democratic Lawyers Delegation to Special Session on Disarmament	Sec. Gen. Internat. Ass. of Democratic Lawyers	30 Days	6/7/82	New York
2	Attend 2nd Special Session UNGA on Disarmament	Non-Governmental Organization	9 Days	6/21/82	New York
15	TOTAL				

1	Vietnamese Vice Pres. of World Peace Council to UNGA Special Session on Disarmament		45 Days	5/31/82	New York	No Visa Support
1	Member of Internat. Committee for European Security and Coopera- tion Delegation to UNGA Special Session on Disarmament		14 Days	6/21/82	New York, Boston Washington	No Visa Support
26	Intourist Tour Group	Intourist		6/4/82	New York, Others	
1	Translator, Soviet Com- mittee for Cooperation with Peace-Loving Forces Delegation to UNGA Special Session on Disarmament		8 Days	6/21/82	New York	No Visa Support
1	Attend UNGA Special Session on Disarmament as Member of Delegation of World Federation of Science Workers - Labor Interest - WPC Member- Ship		10 Days	6/21/82	New York	No Visa Support
7	Attend UNGA Special Session on Disarmament		10 Days	6/21/82	New York	No Visa Support
1	Lecture at Stanford U. California	Stanford U. Calif.	2 Months	6/17/82	Stanford Calif.	
52	Participate in "Friend- ship Ambassador" Tour	"Friendship Ambassadors"	15 Days	7/5/82	New York, Boston Rochester, Wash- ington DC	
2	Attend Meeting with Chkalov Transpolar Flight Committee	Chkalov Trans- polar Flight Committee	8 Days	6/17/82	Portland, Van- couver	
8	1982 Federation Cup Competition	Internat. Tennis Fed. Inc.	30 Days	7/5/82	San Diego, Santa Clara, San Fran.	
100	TOTAL					

2	Attend UNICA Special Session on Disarmament as Members of Christian Peace Conference		10 Days	6/21/82	New York	No Visa Support
1	Personal Translator at UNICA Special Session on Disarmament	United Nations	10 Days	6/21/82	New York	
136	Soviet Track and Field Team	Amateur Ath. Union of U.S.A.	8 Days	6/28/82	Indianapolis	
2	Attend Internat. Youth Work/Study Project, hosted by Volunteers for Peace Inc.	Volunteers for Peace	25 Days	7/20/82	Mount Holly, Vermont	
4	Invitees	US YMCA	18 Days	7/5/82	Washington DC Olivera, New York Toledo	
16	Soviet Track and Field Team Members	Amateur Ath. Union of U.S.A.	10 Days	6/28/82	Indianapolis	
30	Soviet Track and Field Team Members		12 Days	7/12/82	Santa Barbara, California	No Visa Support
1	UN Scholarship in Field of Disarmament	United Nations	74 Days	8/18/82	New York	No Visa Support
1	Soviet Tourist on "Friendship Ambassador" Tour	MFA	15 Days	7/5/82	New York, Boston Rochester, Washington	
1	Invited for Talks	Armenian Gen. Benevolent Un.	16 Days	7/19/82	Detroit, New York Los Angeles, San Francisco	
2	Soviet Cycling Team Attending Sprint Tour-nament	US Cycling Fed.	10 Days	7/14/82	New York, Emmaus and Trexlertown, Pennsylvania	
196	TOTAL					

1	Research Work at SUNY, Buffalo	Universitat Bern	6 Months	8/19/82	New York, Washington	
3	15th International Congress on High Speed Photography and Phonics	Consultant in Engineering & Applied Science	11 Days	8/20/82	Washington DC, San Diego, Bell-Ingham	
1	15th International Congress on High Speed Photography and Phonics	Consultant in Engineering & Applied Science	14 Days	8/20/82	Washington DC, San Diego, Bell-Ingham	With Group Above
42	Soviet Wrestling Team		8 Days	7/29/82	Colorado Springs	No Visa Support
2	Participate in All-Star Soccer Match to Benefit UNICEF	US Soccer Fed.	8 Days	8/3/82	New York, New Jersey	
2	Meeting of Working Group of International Yacht Racing Union	International Windsurfer Class	10 Days	8/1/82	Long Beach, Los Angeles	
1	Soviet Intourist Guide	Thomas Cook Tours	7 Days	9/21/82	Washington DC New York	
30	Soviet Free-Style Wrestling Team	Wrestling Div., AAU and World Elite Championships	12 Days	7/29/82	Colorado Springs	
6	Participate in World Junior Wrestling Championship		12 Days	7/29/82	Colorado Springs	
1	Soviet Intourist Consultant to Accompany Soviet Tourists	Thomas Cook Tours	14 Days	9/30/82	Washington DC, Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, Chicago	
2	Annual Reunion of SEQUAL and FOCAL Programs	SEQUAL	8 Days	7/26/82	New York	
91	TOTAL					

2	Participate in 5th International Symposium on Computer-Assisted Cartography	American Congress on Surveying and Mapping	14 Days	8/17/82	Washington DC Crystal City	
6	Participate in National Playwrights Conference	Eugene O'Neill Theater Center	30 Days	7/18/82	Waterford and New Haven (Conn.), New York, Boston	
2	Industrial Training at Gleason Machine Division		21 Days	7/82		
1	International Symposium on Physical Education and Sport for the Handicapped			11/82		
9	Language Training at SUNY as part of University Exchange Agreement	SUNY-MCU Agreement	4 Months	8/30/82	Boston, Albany New York City	No Visa Support
4	To Participate in International Conference on Energy and Mineral Resources	Circum-Pacific Energy Resources Conference	12 Days	8/19/82	Honolulu, Hawaii	
4	To Participate in 10th Congress of International Comparative Literature Association	International Comparative Literature Association	12 Days	8/82		
8	To Participate in the Conference of New England Newspaper Editors	New England Society of Newspaper Editors and the Colby-Sawyer College	15 Days	8/30/82	Washington, New York, Boston, New London NH	
35	TOTAL					

3	Invited by "American Women for International Understanding"	American Women for International Understanding	7 Days	9/6/82	San Francisco Los Angeles
4	To Participate in the International Conference on Energy and Mineral Resources		12 Days	8/82	
4	Industrial Training "The Dimes Group Inc."		20 Days	8-9/82	
3	Seventh International Symposium on Biotechnology		8 Days	8/82	
8	Maygate Conference on the Physics of Plasma and Thermonuclear Synthesis	International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna	12 Days	8/30/82	Washington and Maryland
1	Invited by North Texas State University	North Texas State University	6 Months	9/2/82	Dallas
66	To Participate in the International Swimming Competition	U.S. Swimming Federation	10 Days	8/23/82	Knoxville
4	US-USSR Atomlin Energy Agreement: Fundamental Properties of Matter		16 Days	8/82	
23	Soviets on Thomas Cook Tour	Thomas Cook Tours	8 Days	9/9/82	Philadelphia, New York, Arrow-Park
116	TOTAL				



1	Invited by people-to- People International and by the University of Minnesota	people-to-people Inter- national and the University of Minnesota	29 Days	9/21/82	New York, Trenton Washington, St. Louis, Indiana- polis, Kansas City, Chicago Minneapolis	
1	To Lecture at Lowell U. sity	Lowell Univer- sity	3 Months	9/9/82		
1	To Attend Meeting of the International Equestrian Federation	US Equestrian Federation	10 Days	9/19/82	Los Angeles	No Visa Support
2	Invited to Study at the United World College of the American West	The United World College of the American West	2 Years	9/6/82	Washington, Albuquerque	
6	Invited to Participate in an American Field Service Exchange Pro- gram to Teach the Rus- sian Language	American Field Service	75 Days	9/20/82	Washington	
4	To the U.S. to par- ticipate in Washington International Horse Race at Laurel Maryland	Laurel Race Course, Inc.	25 Days	3/23/82	Laurel Maryland, Washington	
12	Soviet Figure Skating Team to Participate in "Skate America 82"	Skate America 82	10 Days	10/3/82	Lake Placid	
27	TOTAL					

1	To the U.S. for Scien-	University of	Three Months	10/25/82	New York, Eugene,	NOT IREX
	tific work at the	Oregon and			Oregon	
	University of Oregon	Campbell Inst.				
1	TOTAL					
880	GRAND TOTAL					

## PARTIAL LISTING OF U.S. NON-OFFICIAL EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES IN THE USSR IN 1982

No. of persons	Description	Sponsor	Length of Stay	Date	Remarks	Places Visited
10	Committee on U.S. Soviet Dialogue	Committee on Youth Organizations	7 Days	July 82		Irkutsk, Bratsk, Moscow and Leningrad
30 +	Yale Russian Chorus	Sputnik/CEC	7 Days	Spring 82		Moscow, Leningrad
60	New England Conservatory Youth Orchestra	Friendship Ambassadors	10 Days	June 82		Moscow, Leningrad, Riga
1	Lesbi Armstrong (architect)	Private visit	9 Days	June 82		Moscow, Leningrad
4	Billy Graham Delegation	Moscow Patriarchate	6 Days	May 82		Moscow
1	George White	VAAP (Soviet Copyright)	7 Days	April 82		Moscow, Leningrad
80	U.S. Veterans of WWII	Soviet Veterans Committee	12 Days	Sept 82		Moscow, Volgograd, and Leningrad
30	U.S. Veterans of the Meeting on the Elbe	Soviet Veterans Committee	14 Days	Sept 82		Moscow, Leningrad, Volgograd
1	Edith Markson (theater specialist)	VAAP	21 Days	Feb/Mar 82		Moscow, Leningrad
3	Werner Erhard and Associates	All-Union "Znanie" Society	7 Days	Oct 82		Moscow

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

No. of							
26	U.S. Hockey Team	Unknown	'7-10 Days	Dec 82		Moscow, Leningrad	
23	"I Cantori" Choir, Walla Walla, WA	Sputnik	10 Days	Dec 82	U.S. Sponsor: Friendship Am- bassadors	Moscow, Kiev	
10	Language training at Moscow State Univ.	SUNY-MGU Agreement	4 Months	Aug 82	Undergraduate language study	Albany, NY	
40	American Council of - Teachers of Russian	Pushkin Institute	Semester programs 82	1982	Graduate and undergraduate program	Moscow	
61	Center for Inter- national Educational	Leningrad State Univ	One-semester programs	1982		Leningrad	
4			Academic Year	1982			

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# NATIONAL REVIEW

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## Taxing Business: The Continuing Superstitions

LOWELL HARRISS

ENGLAND FACES  
THE GREAT MIGRATION

*Elsbeth Huxley*

MONT PELERIN'S 25th  
*John Chamberlain*

WM. F. BUCKLEY JR.

## Americans Abroad

On  
The  
Right

Moscow, Sept. 14—If you happen to be in the Ukraine, you should not fail to visit the city of Donetsk, a clean and orderly coal-mining center. In the center of Donetsk, occupying a couple of acres of space in an indoor track gym, are 25 young Americans, aged in their very early twenties. Beginning at ten in the morning, and ending at eight in the evening, the Americans are on duty. Two hours on, one hour off. When they are on duty, they are talking to the ten thousand Russians per day who pass through the United States Information Agency's current exhibit, called "Research and Development U.S.A." They are called "guides," and they have in common their incredible mastery of the Russian language, and their extraordinary charm.

A few of them came by Russian at their Russian mothers' knees, mothers who had emigrated from their Russian homeland. But most got their Russian from American college courses, supplemented by study in the Soviet Union. All of them applied for work as guides, a grueling three-month exposure of five or six hours' daily discourse with Russian peasants, bureaucrats, artisans and intellectuals who file by the exhibit ogling at the Pinto sports car, squinting at the oscilloscopes, running their fingers over the Apollo 10 capsule that circled the moon 31 times, thumbing through the volumes in the technical library, chortling at the scientific *trompe l'oeil* that has you reaching to pick up an exposed coin which under the benevolent protection of trick mirrors evanesces from your grasp—it is all too much, and the conversation tumbles from Russian mouths as if they had been taking vodka all day long.

WHAT DO they say? There is very little that doesn't get said, in the course of a four-week exhibit. Probably the conversational favorite has to do with the automobiles which, in Russia as almost everywhere else among the emerging nations, are the distillate of Everyman's fantasy. "How much does it cost?" I heard a young Russian ask, a little breathlessly. Twenty-five hundred rubles, the coed smiles prettily. You leave the Russian dumbstruck, because he has to pay seven thousand rubles for an automobile which could

only be described as a 1953 Chevrolet manqué. And he can only get it by waiting for seven years, that being the waiting time, in Russia, for automobiles, breakfast, telephone calls, and just about everything except intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Soviet officials put up with the annual U.S. exhibits, the most renowned of which provided the backdrop for the kitchen-debate between Nikita Khrushchev and Richard Nixon in 1959, only because it is their obligation, under the cultural exchange agreement which is renewed every couple of years, to put up with them. That agreement gives the Soviet Union identical privileges to mount its exhibits in the United States and also grants the Communists (and this is what they primarily want) the right to send a few dozen students every year to the United States, to mooch on U.S. technology.

The hospitality of the Soviet hosts is to say the least erratic. It reflects, however unsteadily, the temperature of official Soviet policy toward the United States. That temperature ranges from below freezing to just above freezing, and of course there are Soviet meteorologists who stake out their careers, not to say their lives, on forecasting the temperature, and suggesting appropriate dress. The U.S. exhibitors quite naturally do everything in their power to advertise their presence. But in Russia there is no advertising space in newspapers, or radio, or television. Therefore they rely on such posters as the host city will agree to display, and on the notices given in the local press.

At the afternoon opening in Donetsk on Thursday of last week American officials were tremendously heartened by the splendid diplomatic and municipal representation, by the movie and television cameras, and the three newspaper reporters scribbling away on their pads like court stenographers catching every word of the dignitaries' speeches. Their combined efforts resulted in the following story in one of Friday's newspapers:

"Yesterday in the Donetsk Park of Culture and Recreation, named after Sherkob, the exhibition 'Research and Development in the U.S.A.' opened."

The exhibit director Mr. William Davis, an effervescent, omniscient black

USIA polyglot who speaks German, French, Japanese and Russian, and loves to whip out a photograph of his \$50,000 home in Potomac, Maryland, in whose two-door garage he keeps his Mercedes and his wife's Chevrolet, the three morning newspapers piled on his lap in the car, finally finds the little notice in one of them—and he is alive with delight. We made it! he says triumphantly, as if Clive Barnes had just published a full-page rave. Now he is confident that word of mouth will bring even more Russians into his exhibit in Donetsk, than he could possibly have hoped for! □

### AMERICANS ABROAD—II

Moscow, Sept. 16—It is much too easy to give up in this world, and I am on the side of those who say their beads at night imploring the mercy of the Lord, and those who figure that it is worth the effort to communicate, however fragmentarily, with individual Russian human beings. The United States Information Agency is wedded at least to the latter proposition which is why, in addition to the renowned Voice of America, year after year, doggedly and largely unnoticed, it sends around to six major Soviet cities a U.S. exhibit formed around one or another theme, technological or cultural.

The bare bones of it are: about two million Russians, in six cities, over a six-month period, spending an hour or two in an American exhibit. There they view advanced American technological contrivances. And there they converse with superb American human productions. The cost to the United States comes down to about \$1 per Soviet visitor. I cannot imagine a better leveraged dollar.

What do the Russians ask about, in the technological Disneyland? The expected things—cars in particular. But many of them move quickly into ideological matters. Some of those who do so are readily detected as agents provocateurs. These come with their set speeches of denunciation of American practices international and domestic. The kids cope with them with extraordinary dexterity. But it isn't easy, because they may not take cracks at the host country. One young man told

me that he is frequently tested by the United States for acts of violence. I suggested to him that he might reply that at least in the United States the use of firearms for acts of violence is illegal. But of course that won't do, won't do at all. The ripostes must be non-polemical, non-personal, and maybe even a little oblique.

What do the Russians mostly tax us with? Well, a current favorite is Angela Davis, whose picture and strictures have appeared almost every day in the Soviet press, featuring her critique of America. Miss Davis has been diligently shielded, while in Russia, from the Western press, some of whose members have desired to ask her why she has not inveighed against the exclusion of the press from the trial of the political dissidents in Czechoslovakia. The young Americans are not beyond gently splicing this datum into their replies.

Vietnam remains big in the Soviet press. The Soviet press is best defined as a daily anti-Western spitball in four or six pages. (In the biggest tourist hotels, the only English-written newspaper you can buy is yesterday's *London Daily Worker*. As well ask for a hand grenade as for the *Paris Herald Tribune*.) The American guides proffer explanations. Not answers, but explanations. Several of the guides wear McGovern buttons on their lapels, and routinely profess their own disagreements with Administration policies in Vietnam. The effect on the Russian interrogators is stunning. The guides tell me that many of the Russian visitors come back, sometimes as many as a half-dozen times. I can only assume that in some cases the purpose of the return visit is to discover whether the young bearded guide with the McGovern button has been vaporized, replaced with a Sears, Roebuck Nixonite. Not at all. It surpasses their understanding.

**E**VEN AS Russia surpasses our understanding. Madame Furtseva is the cultural czar of Russia, a lady of striking beauty and charm who is the principal public agent for the enforcement of the dominant Soviet cultural paradox. She manages to maintain the position that in order to be pro-Russian, it is necessary to be anti-Solzhenitsyn. That is what the late Professor Willmoore Kendall used to call a "circle-squaring expedition." I said to the lady: "Will you permit into the Soviet Union any American writer?" "Yes," she said, expansively; coquettishly, even. She then took the initiative. Why were we not spending more time looking into Soviet culture? My friend replied that we had hoped to get tickets to the Bolshoi's *Anna Karenina*, but the house was sold out. Madame Furtseva picked up the telephone and winked, "I am not Minister of Cul-

sure enough midnight descended, as clear and as black as for Cinderella. "You must write a novel," she said as we got up to leave. "Okay," I said, "if you promise to publish it in Russia." "Of course," she beamed, "—just so long as you write the truth." □

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SUBJECT: U.S. IMPRESSARIO JERRY WEINTRAUB'S NEGOTIATIONS  
WITH SOVIETS

## 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: AMERICAN IMPRESSARIO JERRY WEINTRAUB BRIEFED THE AMBASSADOR ON NOVEMBER 13 REGARDING CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN WEINTRAUB/ARMAHD HAMMER AND A NUMBER OF SOVIET ORGANIZATIONS. ACCORDING TO WEINTRAUB HE HAS AN AGREEMENT WITH GOSKOMITETSPORTA ON REPRESENTING SOVIET SPORTS GROUPS IN THE U.S. --PACKAGING AND TV AND A DISTRICT OF CULTURE PROPOSAL THAT WEINTRAUB ARRANGE A U.S. TOUR FOR ANY OF SEVERAL PROMINENT SOVIET PERFORMING ARTS GROUPS. COMPOSERS UNION HEAD KHRENNIKOV EXPRESSED INTEREST IN ARRANGING A WEEK OF SOVIET MUSIC IN N.Y.C. WHICH WOULD INCLUDE PROMINENT SOVIET COMPOSERS AND MUSICIANS, AND WEINTRAUB DISCUSSED WITH THE SOVIETS AN AGREEMENT ON DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET RECORDS IN THE U.S. HE HAS ALSO AGREED TO REVIEW A PACKAGE OF 12 SOVIET FILMS THIS JANUARY AND DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO DISTRIBUTE THEM IN THE U.S. WEINTRAUB'S IMPRESSION FROM HIS MEETINGS WAS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE INTERESTED IN OPENING UP CULTURAL RELATIONS. WHILE THEY WOULD CLEARLY PREFER A CULTURAL AGREEMENT, THEY SEEM PREPARED TO MOVE AHEAD WITHOUT ONE. END SUMMARY.

3. ON NOVEMBER 13, AMERICAN IMPRESSARIO JERRY WEINTRAUB MET WITH THE AMBASSADOR TO BRIEF HIM ON CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN WEINTRAUB, ARMAHD HAMMER, AND VARIOUS SOVIET ORGANIZATIONS CONNECTED WITH THE MINISTRY OF CULTURE, THE STATE COMMITTEE ON PHYSICAL CULTURE AND SPORTS, AND THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR TELEVISION AND RADIO. HIS IMPRESSION FROM HIS MEETINGS WAS THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS INTERESTED IN OPENING UP CULTURAL RELATIONS. WHILE THEY WOULD CLEARLY PREFER A CULTURAL AGREEMENT, THEY ARE PREPARED TO MOVE AHEAD WITHOUT ONE.

4. HE REPORTED TO HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT WITH PAVLOV, GOSKOMITETSPORTA, FOR REPRESENTATION OF SOVIET SPORTS GROUPS IN THE U.S. --PACKAGING AND TV RIGHTS. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD NOT SPECIFICALLY SAY SO, HE BELIEVED THAT HE WOULD HAVE EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS FOR TV. FROM HIS MEETINGS WITH MINICULT, HE REPORTED THAT HE WAS OFFERED ANY PERFORMING ARTS COMPANIES HE WOULD LIKE: SPECIFICALLY, THE MOISEYEV DANCERS (ANYTIME IN THE FALL OF 1983); THE MOSCOW CIRCUS (ANYTIME); AND THE POLSHOI THEATER (FALL OF 1984). HE ALSO MET WITH THE HEAD OF THE COMPOSERS' UNION, YIKHON ANKHEIMOV, WHO WAS INTERESTED IN A WEEK OF SOVIET MUSIC IN NEW YORK WHICH WOULD INCLUDE PROMINENT SOVIET COMPOSERS AND MUSICIANS. HE ALSO DISCUSSED WITH THE

SOVIETS A NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET RECORDINGS IN THE U.S. (PROBABLY WITH MELCHIVA IN THE U.S.S.R.). HE ALSO MENTIONED A WORLDWIDE PUBLISHING COMPANY WHICH WOULD BE A JOINT EFFORT: WEINTRAUB INDICATED THAT FROM HIS MEETINGS WITH MINISTER DENICHEV AND OTHERS HE WAS GIVEN THE CLEAR MESSAGE THAT THE SOVIETS LIKED AMBASSADOR HARTMAN, AND THAT MINISTER DENICHEV WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO AGREE TO MEETING WITH THE AFD-SECSTATE, IF HE REQUESTED IT, SOMETIME SOON WHEN "THE DUST SETTLES."

5. IN COMPARING HIS RECEPTION THIS TIME AS OPPOSED TO HIS RECEPTION A FEW MONTHS AGO, WEINTRAUB SAID THAT THE FIRST TIME THEY (THE SOVIETS) HAD EXPRESSED HOPES FOR IMPROVED CULTURAL RELATIONS, BUT WERE CLEARLY NOT WILLING TO DISCUSS DETAILS OR CONCRETE PROPOSALS. THIS TIME, HOWEVER, FOLLOWING THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, THE ATMOSPHERE HAD IMPROVED IMMENSELY AND THEY ARE NOW WILLING TO DISCUSS INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS AND ENTERTAIN PROPOSALS ON SPECIFIC CONTRACTS.

6. THE OLYMPICS: IN A BRIEF COMMENT, WEINTRAUB INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD TOLD HIM THAT THEY WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE L.A. OLYMPICS, AND THAT PAVLOV, GOSKOMITETSPORTA, WOULD BE COMING TO THE U.S. THIS JANUARY AND WOULD STAY WITH WEINTRAUB.

7. SECURITY: THE QUESTION OF SOVIET CONCERNS FOR "SECURITY" AROSE A NUMBER OF TIMES IN THE WEINTRAUB DISCUSSIONS. MR. FINKELSTEIN SAID THAT THEY HAD BEEN TOLD SPECIFICALLY THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS NOT CONCERNED ABOUT DEFECTIONS, BUT RATHER THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF THE PERFORMERS. THEY WANTED ASSURANCES THAT PERFORMANCES WOULD NOT BE DISRUPTED AND THAT SOVIET PERFORMERS WOULD BE ABLE TO

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TO HAVE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHOUT THREAT OF PHYSICAL ABUSE. HE SAID THAT THE COMMENTS ABOUT LACK OF CONCERN FOR DEFECTIONS CAME FROM LEONTY I. SUPAGIN, DEPUTY CHIEF, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, MINCULT. WEINTRAUB FELT THAT THEY MAY HAVE BROUGHT THIS UP WITH HIM BECAUSE HE IS A KNOWN SUPPORTER OF JEWISH AND ISRAELI CAUSES AND THUS HAS INFLUENCE WITH THOSE GROUPS WHO MIGHT ENGAGE IN DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES. HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD MADE KNOWN HIS WILLINGNESS TO SPEAK TO VARIOUS GROUPS TO HEAD OFF THESE ACTIVITIES. (COMMENT: WE CONCUR IN WEINTRAUB'S ASSESSMENT, BUT STILL BELIEVE THE PRIMARY SOVIET CONCERN IS WITH DEFECTIONS. END COMMENT)

8. THE AMBASSADOR REVIEWED FOR MR. WEINTRAUB THE HISTORY OF SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT AND CAUTIONED THAT THE SOVIET DEFINITION OF "SECURITY" MIGHT WELL STILL EXCEED SIMPLE PHYSICAL PROTECTION. WEINTRAUB FELT THAT ANY WILLINGNESS BY THE DEPARTMENT TO COOPERATE IN INFORMING LOCAL AUTHORITIES OR REQUESTING ASSISTANCE ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION--WHICH SCHEMOV MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN A CONTRACT--WOULD BE USEFUL. THE AMBASSADOR AGREED TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF WHAT THE DEPARTMENT WAS WILLING TO SAY IN THE ABSENCE OF A CULTURAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT. (IT WAS POINTED OUT TO MR. WEINTRAUB THAT IN RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH MINCULT AND MID THE DEFINITION OF A LEGITIMATE DEFECTION HAS BECOME A SLIPPERY AREA, WITH THE SOVIETS SEEMING TO EQUATE ALL DEFECTIONS WITH PROVOCATIONS BY AMERICAN "SPECIAL SERVICES." IF THIS IS THE CASE SOVIETS MAY SAY THEY DO NOT WORRY ABOUT DEFECTIONS, BUT IN FACT BE VERY CONCERNED.

9. WEINTRAUB SAID THAT HE HAD EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TRIP AND THE HOPEFULLY CHANGING ATMOSPHERE AND THAT HIS REMARKS WERE MET BY A CLEARLY RECEPTIVE AUDIENCE. THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT THESE MAJOR SOVIET GROUPS WERE CLEARLY BEING OFFERED FOR THEIR FOREIGN CURRENCY EARNING POTENTIAL, AND WHILE WE WERE CLEARLY INTERESTED IN THESE GROUPS, WE WERE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT EXPOSURE OF SOVIET AUDIENCES TO AMERICAN CULTURAL GROUPS. IN THE CURRENT SITUATION WE ARE RESTRICTED TO WHAT CAN BE PRESENTED ON OFFICIAL AMERICAN PREMISES. WEINTRAUB RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD CLEARLY BE INTERESTED IN AMERICAN GROUPS. BECAUSE HE WAS INTERESTED IN A LONG TERM RELATIONSHIP HE WANTED TO GO SLOWLY AND HAD SPECIFICALLY DISCUSSED ONLY A POTENTIAL CONCERT SERIES BY JOHN DENVER. THE AMBASSADOR ADVISED THAT A CAUTIOUS APPROACH WOULD BE BEST, TO START WITH SOMETHING NOT TOO GRANDIOSE AND TEST THE ATMOSPHERE AND SEE HOW IT DEVELOPS.

10. WEINTRAUB SAID THAT DEMICHEV HAD INDICATED THAT THERE

WERE GENERALLY VERY GOOD FEELINGS FROM THE RUCH-ANDROPOV MEETINGS. HERE WEINTRAUB HAD INDICATED TO DEMICHEV THAT HE KNEW RUCH WELL AND CALLED HIM AS A MAN OF PEACE. AT THE MINCULT, WEINTRAUB HAD NOT HIT IT OFF WITH MRS. BUTROVA DURING THE FIRST VISIT AND INTERESTINGLY SHE WAS NOT IN EVIDENCE DURING THEIR CURRENT DISCUSSIONS. MINCULT USA DESK OFFICER, VLADIMIR ILICH LITVINOV, WAS PRESENT FOR MOST DISCUSSIONS AND INDICATED TO WEINTRAUB THAT HE WOULD BE TALKING TO EMBASSY OFFICERS ABOUT THE PROGRESS THEY HAD MADE.

11. WEINTRAUB MET WITH LAPIN AND POPOV AT GOSTELRADIO, BUT NO DETAILS OF THIS DISCUSSION WERE FORTHCOMING.

12. IN MEETING WITH THE HEAD OF GOSKINO (YERMASH), WEINTRAUB WAS OFFERED THE POSSIBILITY (WHICH HE ACCEPTED) TO REVIEW A PACKAGE OF TWELVE RECENT SOVIET FILMS, WHICH WOULD BE SPECIALLY SUBTITLED FOR HIM, AND DELIVERED IN JANUARY, AND TO SEE IF HE LIKED THEM AND WANTED TO DISTRIBUTE THEM IN THE U.S. YERMASH INDICATED A DESIRE TO HAVE WEINTRAUB COME TO THE NEXT MOSCOW FILM FESTIVAL.

13. THE AMBASSADOR REVIEWED FOR MR. WEINTRAUB THE EMBASSY'S OWN CULTURAL PROGRAM, WHICH UNDER THE CURRENT SITUATION, MUST BE CARRIED OUT MOSTLY UNDER PRIVATE SPONSORSHIP AND ON EMBASSY PREMISES. THE AMBASSADOR OUTLINED THE EMBASSY'S FILM PROGRAM, INVITATIONS TO PROMINENT AMERICAN SPECIALISTS TO COME AS THE AMBASSADOR'S GUESTS, SMALL CULTURAL PRESENTATIONS, ETC.--ALL DESIGNED TO DRAW INTO SPASO HOUSE SELECTED SOVIET AUDIENCES. MR. WEINTRAUB

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INDICATED HIS WILLINGNESS AND INTEREST IN HELPING OUT IN ANY WAY THAT HE COULD, SUCH AS THE PROVISION OF A PIANO WHICH HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY RESOLVED. WEINTRAUB SAID HE HAD PRODUCED FILMS SUCH AS "DINER" AND "NASHVILLE," AND WOULD BE HAPPY TO PROVIDE US THEATER PRINTS FOR SHOWING AT SPASO HOUSE. HE ALSO MENTIONED HIS AND ARMAND HAMMER'S WILLINGNESS TO HELP ON OTHER CULTURAL PROJECTS SUCH AS A POSSIBLE SHOWING OF YAKOV RUBINSSTEIN'S ART COLLECTION (ALTHOUGH HE WOULD HIMSELF UNDERTAKE LARGER EXHIBITIONS SUCH AS THE HERMITAGE COLLECTION), AND SUPPORT FOR INVITATIONS TO SUCH SOVIET CULTURAL FIGURES AS YURY LIUBIMOV, DIRECTOR OF THE TAGANKA THEATER.

14. MISCELLANY: IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH DEMICHEV, AN INTERPRETER WAS PRESENT AND ALL DEMICHEV'S COMMENTS WERE IN RUSSIAN. DEMICHEV BEGAN HIS TRAINING IN CHEMISTRY. THE ONLY REQUEST MADE BY THE SOVIETS WAS TO HAVE WEINTRAUB HELP GET AEROFLOT FLIGHTS BACK ON A REGULAR SCHEDULE TO THE STATES. HARTMAN

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The Washington Times

October 7, 1982

PAGE 5B

# BUSINESS

## U.S. aid to be sought for Soviet pipeline

SCOW (AP) — U.S. industrialist Armand Hammer announced yesterday that he will ask the Reagan administration to approve the use of American technology for a projected coal slurry pipeline from Siberia to Moscow.

Hammer named the private San Francisco engineering firm Bechtel and the Italian company ENI as possible partners of the Soviets in the 1,000-mile pipeline project. He did not say how much the pipeline will cost.

George Shultz was president of Bechtel before becoming secretary of state. "I'm hopeful I can persuade the administration," Hammer told a news conference. "This is different from the gas pipeline."

Hammer, president and chairman of the board of Occidental Petroleum Corp., referred to the ban on U.S. equipment and technology for the Siberian gas pipeline to Western Europe. The Reagan administration imposed the ban because of the alleged Soviet law imposing martial law in Poland.

Hammer, who has had close business and personal ties with Soviet leaders since the Lenin era, arrived in Moscow Sunday. He met with Culture Minister Pyotr Demichiev, Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai S. Patolichev and the minister of chemical industry, Leonid A. Kostandov.

Kostandov expressed interest in the use of U.S. technology and equipment for the coal pipeline, which has been under discussion for several years, Hammer said. Coal slurry is ground coal mixed with water which is then pumped to its destination through the pipeline, drained, and burned as fuel.

The American industrialist also announced the signing of five preliminary agreements between the newly formed Jerry Weintraub-Armand Hammer Productions and several Soviet state-run companies on joint entertainment projects.

Details of the the agreements will be worked out in November, Hammer said. Weintraub told reporters the first



Armand Hammer

project would probably be a John Denver concert show with a Soviet orchestra to be filmed in Moscow. The company also hopes to arrange a rematch between the U.S. and Soviet hockey teams that competed at the 1980 Olympics in Lake Placid, N.Y., as well as soccer matches and gymnastic competitions, he said.

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 81 OF 82 MOSCOW 15245

USIA FOR D, EU (GILLEN), P/REV, P/DC (CARSTONES)

STATE FOR EUR/SOV, EUR/SOV/SOEX

E.O. 12356: DECL: 12/15/27  
TAGS: UR, OEXC, SCUL

SUBJECT: MINISTRY OF CULTURE REACTION TO JERRY WEINTRAUB'S VISIT

REF: (A) MOSCOW 15868, (B) MOSCOW 05092

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT A NOVEMBER 29 MEETING AT THE MINCULT, THE SOVIETS SOUGHT TO ESTABLISH THE "BONA FIDES" OF JERRY WEINTRAUB, WHOSE EFFORTS TO BRING SOVIET PERFORMING ARTS GROUPS TO THE U.S. ARE CLEARLY OF INTEREST TO THEM, THOUGH THEY CLAIMED NO KNOWLEDGE OF WEINTRAUB'S SPECIFIC INITIATIVES. THERE WAS NO MENTION OF AN "ANTI-DEFECTOR" CLAUSE AND NO REFERENCE TO U.S. "SPECIAL SERVICES" (SPETS SLUZHBY). THE MINCULT RATHER CONCENTRATED ON ONE POINT: ANY TOURS OF SOVIET PERFORMING ARTS GROUPS ORGANIZED BY JERRY WEINTRAUB WOULD REQUIRE SOME MEASURE OF APPROVAL BY THE USG AND COULD NOT TAKE PLACE ON A STRICTLY COMMERCIAL BASIS. THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO BE TRYING FOR A SERIES OF MINI-AGREEMENTS ON SPECIFIC CULTURAL EXCHANGES. SEE COMMENT IN PARA 3. END SUMMARY.

3. ON NOVEMBER 29 CAO AND ACAA MET WITH A.A. BUTROVA, CHIEF OF WEST EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN SECTION OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS ADMINISTRATION OF MINCULT AND THE AMERICAN DESK OFFICER R.I. LITVINOV. BUTROVA OPENED THE MEETING BY ASKING ABOUT THE RECENT ACTIVITIES OF JERRY WEINTRAUB (THOUGH THIS WAS NOT ON THE AGENDA FOR THE MEETING) AND SOUGHT TO ESTABLISH THE EXTENT OF WEINTRAUB'S EXPERIENCE, INFLUENCE, TALENT, AND RELIABILITY. CAO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO ASK ABOUT WEINTRAUB'S TALKS AT THE MINCULT AND ELSEWHERE DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE U.S.S.R. BUT BUTROVA PLEADED IGNORANCE OF ANY CONCRETE INITIATIVES.

4. ... BUTROVA DID, HOWEVER, OUTLINE HER POSITION ON THIS TYPE OF ACTIVITY, STRESSING THAT TOURS BY SOVIET PERFORMING ARTS GROUPS COULD NOT TAKE PLACE ON A PURELY COMMERCIAL BASIS ("WE DO NOT TRADE IN PEOPLE") BUT RATHER WOULD REQUIRE SOME TYPE OF USG APPROVAL. SHE WENT ON TO SUGGEST AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES, THE SOVIET NOTE GIVING PARTICULARS OF A SPECIFIC VENTURE AND THE U.S. NOTE APPROVING THE VENTURE IN QUESTION. THE ABSENCE OF AN OBJECTION ON THE PART OF THE USG WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT, SHE OBSERVED. BUTROVA INDICATED THE NEED FOR USG APPROVAL BOTH TO PROVIDE LEGITIMACY TO THE VENTURE AS WELL AS TO ENSURE THE PHYSICAL SAFETY OF SOVIET PERFORMING ARTISTS. THE CAO REPLIED THAT IF THE QUESTION WERE ONE OF PHYSICAL SECURITY, THE USG COULD CONSIDER INFORMING THE RELEVANT LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND ASK THEM TO PROVIDE WHATEVER SECURITY MIGHT BE REQUIRED TO ENSURE THE SAFETY

OF SOVIET GROUPS. NOTING THAT USG APPROVAL OF ANY GIVEN PERFORMING ARTS TOUR WAS A MATTER QUITE APART FROM SECURITY, THE CAO AGREED TO PASS ON BUTROVA'S IDEA. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT ON THIS OCCASION THE SOVIETS MADE NO MENTION OF U.S. "SPECIAL SERVICES" (SPETS SLUZHBY) OR U.S. GUARANTEES TO THWART DEFECTIONS.

5. COMMENT: BASED ON BUTROVA'S REMARKS, THE MINCULT SEEMS TO HAVE SHIFTED FROM EMPHASIZING SECURITY GUARANTEES TO EMPHASIZING USG APPROVAL OF EXCHANGES ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. IT IS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, WHETHER HER REMARKS REFLECT OVERALL SOVIET EXCHANGE POLICY OR JUST THE VIEWS OF THE MINCULT. IF THE LATTER IS THE CASE, BUTROVA'S HIGH-MINDED DEFENSE OF THE ARTIST MAY REPRESENT THE MINCULT'S ATTEMPT TO FORESTALL DELEGATION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMMERCIAL-BASED U.S.-U.S.S.R. EXCHANGES TO ANOTHER SOVIET INSTITUTION. THERE WAS NOTHING IN BUTROVA'S REMARKS TO SUGGEST HER AWARENESS THAT A STRONG U.S.-U.S.S.R. EXCHANGE PROGRAM CONDUCTED BY PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS ON THE U.S. SIDE WOULD WORK TO THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE, I.E. IT WOULD OPEN UP THE U.S. TO THE INFLUENCE OF SOVIET CULTURAL ACTIVITIES WHILE MAINTAINING RESTRICTIONS ON U.S.G. CULTURAL ACTIVITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION. ALL THIS SUGGESTS THAT THE NOTION OF LEGITIMACY AND RECOGNITION ASSOCIATED WITH INTERGOVERNMENTAL CULTURAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS STILL HOLDS SWAY OVER MANY IN THE MINCULT; THIS SENSITIVITY WAS APPARENT AT DEPUTY MINISTER OF CULTURE BARABASH'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL EXCHANGES (REFTEL 8), WHEN HE ENUMERATED THE VARIOUS AGREEMENTS IN FORCE. THE MINISTRY'S PRESENT STRATEGY IS APPARENTLY TO ESTABLISH A NUMBER OF MINI-AGREEMENTS ON SPECIFIC EXCHANGES (BUTROVA'S SUGGESTED EXCHANGE OF BT  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 15245

USIA FOR.D, EU (DILLEN), P/REU, P/DC (CARSTONES)

STATE FOR EUR/SOV, EUR/SOV/SOEX

E.O. 12356: DECL: 12/15/87

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NOTES WOULD CONSTITUTE A MINI-AGREEMENT) AND USING THESE  
AS PRECEDENTS, GRADUALLY EFFECT A CHANGE IN OVERALL USG  
POLICY. FORTUNATELY THIS STRATEGY LEAVES US WITH SOME  
LEVERAGE. WHAT IS NOT KNOWN IS WHETHER THE FAILURE  
OF THIS POLICY WOULD SIGNAL A MOVEMENT INTO COMMERCIAL-  
BASED EXCHANGES WITH PRIVATE U.S. IMPRESSARIOS, PERHAPS  
SPEARHEADED ON THE SOVIET SIDE BY AN ORGANIZATION LIKE  
GOSKONTsert. END COMMENT. ZIMMERMANN

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NSDD 75 on "U.S. Relations with the USSR"

3. U.S.-Soviet Cooperative Exchanges: The role of U.S.-Soviet cultural, educational, scientific and other cooperative exchanges should be seen in light of the U.S. intention to maintain a strong ideological component in relations with Moscow. The U.S. should not further dismantle the framework of exchanges; indeed those exchanges which could advance the U.S. objective of promoting positive evolutionary change within the Soviet system should be expanded. At the same time, the U.S. will insist on full reciprocity and encourage its Allies to do so as well. This recognizes that unless the U.S. has an effective official framework for handling exchanges, the Soviets will make separate arrangements with private U.S. sponsors, while denying reciprocal access to the Soviet Union. U.S. policy on exchanges must also take into account the necessity to prevent transfer of sensitive U.S. technology to the Soviet Union. (S)

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**United States  
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Director

Washington, D.C. 20547

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable  
Judge William P. Clark

FROM: Charles Z. Wick

SUBJECT: NSDD 75 on "U.S. Relations with the USSR"

We have received a copy of NSDD 75 on "U.S. Relations with the USSR," and are pleased to note that the language I suggested to you on the need for strict reciprocity in exchanges has been included on page 6, paragraph 3.

In my December 22 memorandum to you (see attachment A), I suggested that "to achieve this strict ideological 'reciprocity' there might be a need to prepare the way either for executive action, such as the withholding of visas, or legislation."

I made this observation on the premise that "...the Soviets should not be allowed to exploit our pluralistic system and private sector mechanisms." My memo goes on to say, "The question is: Should we do anything about this? If so, what are we going to do?"

I am writing to you now to suggest an answer to that question.

In 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (d) (supp. V 1976), it is stated that:

"The Secretary of State may refuse to recommend a waiver for aliens from signatory countries which are not in substantial compliance with the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, particularly the human rights and humanitarian affairs provisions."

The amendment cited above forms the basis for our suggestion as to how the language on maintaining reciprocity in exchanges contained in NSDD 75, page 6, paragraph 3, might be implemented.

On a selective basis the Administration may wish to deny visas to Soviet cultural and exchange groups as a way of maintaining the strict reciprocity called for in NSDD 75.

cc: Ken Dam